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LIFE INSURANCE—INSURABLE INTEREST AND THE FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT: WHY MEDICAID SETTLEMENT LEGISLATION 
CRACKS THE FOUNDATION OF THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
Heather Harris * 
Life insurance products must be distinguishable from financial 
instruments by including time-tested insurance safeguards.  
Congress should exercise its authority under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act to permit insurance providers to offer and 
negotiate insurable interest as a contract term, and to price such 
policies accordingly. 
State law mandates that a life insurance policy owner must have 
an insurable interest in the insured at the time of purchase.  
This does not apply to the transfer of ownership after the policy 
is in force.  Life settlement companies purchase these policies 
for approximately one-third of the death benefit, becoming the 
owner and paying the remaining premiums.  The company then 
receives the full death benefit when the insured dies. 
Recent state legislation permits policy forfeiture in exchange 
for Medicaid benefits to the insured.  The Medicaid applicant 
forfeits the life insurance policy in exchange for Medicaid 
qualification.  Either the state or a third-party investor receives 
the death benefit when the insured dies, who may not be the 
policy owner. 
Texas, Kentucky, Kansas, and Indiana have passed such 
legislation, and other states are actively considering proposals.  
At the time of contract formation, life insurers did not price 
these policies to cover payouts encouraged by this legislation.  
These financial losses will subsequently be passed to consumers, 
 * J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2016.  The opinions in 
this Note are solely my own.  I would like to thank Professor René Reich-Graefe for 
being an enthusiastic and invaluable mentor.  I am indebted to Mr. Stephen Baker for 
aiding me in my background research.  I am grateful to the Western New England Law 
Review for their efforts and support throughout the editorial process.  Thank you to 
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and jeopardize the future affordability of life insurance. 
INTRODUCTION 
I am a committed defender of insurable interest. I consider a
healthy concept of insurable interest to be essential to the
effective functioning of the life insurance industry, and I view the
mounting effort to erode that concept as the most dangerous
development to the industry of the last generation.1
In the fictional story The Hunger Games, people—humans—
are dropped into an arena to fight to the death.2  Outsiders watch 
with substantial money at stake.  The wagers are based on detailed 
information about each human “Tribute”; details that predict how 
much time each has left on this earth. 
You abhor those who sent the humans to the arena for the 
violence they create.  The spectators disgust you; the distaste in 
profiting from a human death stands independent of the distaste 
for violence and it shocks the conscience almost more than the 
violence itself.  You are repulsed by them watching, that they are 
rooting for someone’s demise.  Strangers or not, there is something 
inherently wrong about the desire for death, something intrinsically 
menacing about profiting from a human passing.  Wagering on 
human life turns the stomach, and violates a universal moral code. 
Gambling on human life continues to encroach on the life 
insurance industry.  Life insurance policies are sold to investors and 
valued based on how quickly the investor expects death; the shorter 
the life expectancy, the lower the financial risk, and the higher the 
bid.3  As a gamble, the only loss is money.  There is no sadness, no 
mourning, no bereavement attached to the bet. 
The distinguishing feature between a life insurance policy sold 
to an investor and one retained by a loved one is the lack of 
insurable interest.  An insurable interest is a benefit from the 
1. Telephone Interview with Stephen C. Baker, Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath 
(Sep. 10, 2014).  Mr. Baker is a nationally known litigator, specializing in the defense of 
insurance companies in the secondary market of life insurance.  Most notably for 
purposes of this Note, Mr. Baker defended Lincoln Life & Annuity Company of New 
York in the landmark case Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 N.E.2d 535 (N.Y. 
2010).  Biography, DRINKERBIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/people/attorneys/ 
baker-stephen-c [https://perma.cc/97GU-JASQ] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
2.  SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES (2008). 
3.  Seniors Beware: What You Should Know About Life Settlements, 
FINRA.ORG, http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/seniors-beware-what-you-should-
know-about-life-settlements [https://perma.cc/8BPB-YKQ6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter Seniors Beware]. 
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“continued life of another.”4  According to the Supreme Court of 
the United States, “[a] man cannot take out insurance on the life of 
a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not so connected with 
him as to make the continuance of the life a matter of some real 
interest to him.”5 
Insurable interest is often referenced by the Supreme Court, 
which describes insurable interest as much by what the term 
attempts to prevent, wager policies, as by what is included: a man’s 
own life, a family member’s life and a creditor’s relationship with a 
debtor.6  The insurable interest requirement is in the interest of 
public policy.7  Without insurable interest, “the [life insurance] 
contract does not have the same manifest utility and assumes more 
speculative characteristics which may subject it to the same general 
condemnation as wagers.”8  Insurance reduces risk, but wagers 
assume risk9 and there is frankly “a sinister counter interest in 
having the life come to an end.”10 
In 1911, the Supreme Court held in Grigsby v. Russell that the 
insurable interest requirement of a life insurance contract11 does 
not extend to the assignment of the policy once in force.12  
Therefore, after policy inception, the owner is free to assign13 it to 
someone without an insurable interest.14  Over the past century, 
this decision has turned the life insurance industry into an arena for 
investing and wagering on the lives of others. 
The terrain now has a new player—states.  In 2013, Texas 
became the first state to enact a life settlement program to fund 
4.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).   
5.  Id. 
6.  Id.; Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155–56 (1911) (“The very meaning of an 
insurable interest is an interest in having the life continue” and so “wagers came to be 
regarded as a mischievous kind of gaming.”).   
7.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 
(1881) (reinforcing that wager policies are, “independently of any statute on the 
subject, condemned, as being against public policy.”). 
8.  New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 73 N.Y.2d 74, 78 (1989). 
9.  Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (“Historically and commonly 
insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing.”). 
10.  Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 154.   
11.  At its root, a life insurance policy is a contract, and will be referred to as such 
when discussing the policy in the context of contract law.  Grigsby, 222 U.S. 149, 155 
(“[There is n]o question as to the character of that contract . . . before us.”).  
12.  Id. at 149.   
13.  To consummate the sale of a life insurance policy, the rights of the policy are 
assigned to the purchaser.  Id. at 149.   
14.  Id. at 157.   
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Medicaid;15 other states are following suit.16  States are diligently 
forming groups to study the financial impact of legislation, but the 
interests of insurers are mostly absent in these studies.17 
A life settlement is the sale of a life insurance policy for 
value.18  The life settlement market thwarts the basic tenet and 
purpose of life insurance—insurable interest.19  “[L]ife insurance 
has become a major, if not the major, factor in the concern of men 
generally for the protection of their families and dependents.”20  
The threat to the purpose, affordability, and sustainability of life 
insurance has escalated with the entrance of states in the life 
settlement market.21  Congress should reestablish the role of 
insurable interest and, in response to current conditions, allow 
insurers the freedom to contract, thereby clarifying Grigsby, which 
is currently interpreted as enforcing a right to sell a life insurance 
policy, rather than enforcing a contract under its terms and 
applicable law.22 
In order to allow insurers to respond to the new state 
legislation, Congress should enact federal legislation to permit 
insurers to offer and negotiate insurable interest as a contract term, 
and to price such policies accordingly.  Allowing the life insurance 
industry to distinguish itself from the life settlement market will 
15.  TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015). 
16.  E.g., IND. CODE § 12-15-121.7 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2015); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631 (West 2014).   
17.  E.g., COMM’N TO STUDY LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES, FINAL REP., S. 126, 
1st Sess., (Me. 2013), http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/LTC2013reportpart1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6YRP-GWJ8]. 
18.  What is a Life Settlement?, LIFE INS. SETTLEMENT ASS’N 
http://www.lisa.org/content/13/What-is-a-Life-Settlement.aspx [https://perma.cc/G74S-
4Y9Q] (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1111A.002 (West 2011) 
(defining a life settlement contract as “a written agreement entered into between a 
provider and an owner establishing the terms under which compensation . . . will be 
paid . . . in return for the owner’s assignment, transfer, sale, devise, or bequest of the 
death benefit.”). 
19. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (“That life insurance is 
desirable from an economic and social standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk 
of loss from premature death is unquestionable.”).  
20.  Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 171 F.2d 982, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1948). 
21.  Wm. Scott Page, Texas Medicaid Law Could Transform Life Insurance 
Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/wm-scott-page/texas-medicaid-law-could_b_3837442.html 
[https://perma.cc/3D4X-AVK7].  (“The ramifications [of this legislation to life 
insurance companies] are enormous to say the least.”). 
22.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 157 (1911).  The Court looked to the terms 
of the life insurance contract at issue, and “with no rule of law” requiring insurable 
interest, permitted the assignment.  Id. 
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ensure the future viability of life insurance for the benefit of those 
who need it most.23  Once federally authorized, insurers could offer 
two distinct life insurance policies: one with free assignability 
regardless of insurable interest at a higher premium, and one that is 
only assignable with insurable interest at the time of future sale at a 
reduced premium.  Under this proposal, the insurance industry 
would bifurcate between the insurance product meant to financially 
protect those left behind after death—the classic life insurance 
product24—and a financial tool that enriches a stranger at the 
insured’s death.25 
This Note will trace the history of insurable interest beginning 
in England and continuing to its reception into the common law of 
the United States.  It will then examine the Supreme Court’s early 
perspective of insurable interest and the impact of these 
fundamental high-court decisions on the establishment of the 
secondary market.  Next, this Note will compare the relationship 
that states have with insurable interest, and how states handle 
permutations of the secondary market. 
Finally, this Note will argue that the most recent development 
in the evolution of insurable interest—i.e. states passing Medicaid 
settlement legislation in an attempt to defray state-funded 
healthcare costs for their respective residents—is contrary to the 
long-held support of insurable interest, and is dangerous to the 
solvency of the life insurance industry.  This Note concludes with a 
federal call to action; a proposal to split the life insurance market 
from the life settlement market and allow the resulting insurance-
product markets to determine the sustainability of the life 
settlement market when it cannot rely on insurance industry 
subsidization. 
23.  A growing life settlement market threatens the life insurance industry.  See 
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE 20 (2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/lifesettlements-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AH5F-VRSQ] (“While life settlements may impact insurer’s 
profitability and financial condition[s] . . . the extent of this impact is likely to be small 
[due to] the very small percentage of [life insurance] policies that have been settled.”). 
24. Id. at V.  (“[T]he historical social policy of insurance . . . is to protect 
families . . . from potential economic hardship caused by untimely death of the 
insured.”)  Id. 
25.  TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1111A.002 (West 2011). 
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I. INSURABLE INTEREST 
A.  Across the Ocean: The Birth of Insurable Interest 
Wager policies were outlawed in England by the Life 
Assurance Act of 177426 and this prohibition was integrated into 
the common law in the United States.27  “[T]he concept [of 
insurable interest] is embedded”28 in The Life Assurance Act of 
1774 as a means to prevent wager policies.29  This requirement of 
insurable interest in a life insurance contract was in response to 
historic wager policies that ended in the death of the insured.30  In a 
wager, the beneficiary of life insurance has “no interest whatever”31 
in the insured remaining alive, yet does have an interest in the 
insured’s death in the amount of the death benefit.32  The dangers 
inherent in such fundamental conflicts of interest violate public 
policy.33 
B.  Insurable Interest Historically in the United States 
As insurable interest “became firmly rooted in the common 
law of every state in the Union . . .”34 the Supreme Court explored 
the lines that separated wager policies from those with insurable 
interest, defining and updating the concept along the way.35  In 
1876 the Supreme Court in Schaefer defined a wager policy as one 
in which the policy owner has “no interest whatever in the matter 
insured, but only an interest in its loss or destruction.”36  A wife 
purchased life insurance on her husband, but subsequent to the 
26.  Life Assurance Act, 14 Geo. 3 (1774) (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
apgb/Geo3/14/48/section/1 [https://perma.cc/MK52-XGHY]. 
27.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876). 
28.  PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust ex rel. Christiana Bank 
& Trust Co., 28 A.3d 1059, 1069 (Del. 2011). 
29.  Id.  (“Parliament enacted the Life Assurance Act of 1774 which prohibited 
the use of insurance as a wagering contract unlinked to a demonstrated economic 
risk.”). 
30.  Id. 
31.  Campbell v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 381, 386 (1867). 
32.  Id. 
33.  See, e.g., Wainwright v. Bland. (1865) 150 Eng. Rep. 334, https://archive.org/ 
details/casesonlawofinsu00vanc [https://perma.cc/R49G-HVBG] (depicting 
Wainwright, an incorrigible criminal who poisoned Helen Abercromby with the 
deliberate purpose of obtaining the insurance money). 
34.  PHL Variable Ins. Co., 28 A.3d at 1069. 
35. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876); Warnock v. 
Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881); Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). 
36.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460.   
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purchase, the marriage ended and later still, the insured died.37  No 
assignment took place.  The purpose of life insurance, in the eyes of 
the Court, was the “well-grounded expectations of support” that 
would otherwise cease with the death of the insured.38  Therefore, 
absent post-marital support obligations, the ex-wife no longer had 
an insurable interest in her former husband.39  However, the Court 
held that the policy was not void for the former wife’s cessation of 
insurable interest.40  Citing English cases after the Life Assurance 
Act of 1774, the Court stated that while there must be an insurable 
interest at the effective date of life insurance, “it need not continue 
until death” and therefore, this was not a wager policy.41 
Five years later the Supreme Court in Warnock again 
examined the insurable interest requirement after policy issuance.42  
This time, the policy owner sold the interest in a life insurance 
policy to a trust association with no insurable interest.43  Here, the 
Court defined insurable interest as “a reasonable ground, founded 
upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or 
of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the 
continuance of the life of the assured.”44  Without insurable 
interest, the policy becomes a wager because the owner “is 
interested in the death rather than the life of the party assured.  
The law ought to be, and we think it clearly is, opposed to such 
speculations in human life.”45  The Court limited the trust 
association’s benefit to the amount the association had paid in 
premiums, with interest.46 
The Court’s remedy was similar to a collateral assignment.  In 
a collateral assignment, there is a creditor-debtor relationship and 
therefore insurable interest because the creditor has an interest in 
the debtor surviving and paying the debt.47  If the debtor dies 
before satisfying the debt, the creditor is entitled to the death 
benefit up to the amount of the existing debt.48  Therefore, the 
37.  Id. at 457.  
38.  Id. at 461.   
39.  Id. at 462.   
40.  Id.  In other words, there is no underlying legal or moral obligation. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881). 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. at 779. 
45.  Id. at 780.   
46.  Id. at 781.   
47.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876).   
48. Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659, 662 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Unlike an 
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creditor is made whole, but does not profit from the debtor’s 
death.49 
Warnock is valuable because the Court clarified that the 
insurable interest requirement extended beyond the inception of 
the policy.50  The reason for requiring insurable interest at the 
purchase of the policy extends to assignment: “the same ground 
which invalidates the one should invalidate the other.”51  However, 
thirty years later the Supreme Court again addressed the issue.52 
In 1911, the Supreme Court established the authority cited by 
the life settlement market as the basis for its very existence, 
Grigsby v. Russell.53  In this seminal case, Mr. Burchard needed 
money for surgery.54  As a way to fund the operation, Mr. Burchard 
sold his life insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby for one hundred 
dollars, and assigned the life insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby.55  Mr. 
Burchard’s death (about one year later)56 was unrelated to the 
surgery.57 
The Court reasoned that the sale between Mr. Burchard and 
Dr. Grigsby was “very different from granting such a general 
license, to allow [Mr. Burchard] to transfer it to one whom he, the 
party most concerned, is not afraid to trust.”58  This scenario lacked 
the “mischievous kind of gaming” objectionable since early English 
cases.59  The Court in Grigsby distinguished itself from its holding 
in Warnock by stating that the policy in Warnock was purchased 
absolute assignment, which permanently transfers all rights in the policy to the 
assignee, a collateral assignment transfers only those rights necessary to secure the 
assignor’s debt.”). 
49.  Id.   
50. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779 (“The assignment of a policy to a party not having 
an insurable interest is as objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his name.”). 
51.  Id. at 782.   
52.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).   
53.  Id.; see Life Settlement Questions, POLICY SETTLEMENT, 
http://policysettlement.com/q-and-a/ [https://perma.cc/J5EF-UNRK] (last visited Feb. 
22, 2016) (“Life settlements were legalized in The United States in 1911 by [the] 
Supreme Court Decision [Grigsby v. Russell].”); see also History of Life Settlements in 
the U.S., LIFE INS. SETTLEMENT ASS’N, http://www.lisa.org/content/51/life-settlement-
history.aspx [https://perma.cc/T844-SRRL] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“The legal basis 
for life settlements as a legitimate option for life insurance owners may be found in the 
Grigsby v. Russell decision from the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
54.  Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 154. 
55.  Id.  
56.  History of Life Settlements in the U.S., supra note 53.   
57.  Russell v. Grigsby, 168 F. 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1909) rev’d, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). 
58.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911). 
59.  Id. at 156.   
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for the purpose of assignment.60  However, a dying patient in need 
of surgery may have played on the Grigsby Court’s sympathy 
causing it to grasp for a non-existent distinction because the 
Warnock Court made no such distinction.61  Grigsby discussed the 
property rights often associated with life insurance policies, as well 
as the economic risk to the value of life insurance as an asset if 
these property rights were not upheld.62  And thus came the 
secondary market for life insurance. 
II.  THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR LIFE INSURANCE 
Despite the common law rule against wager policies, the 
practice of wagering still exists, continuously morphing in an 
attempt to overcome statutory or common law hurdles.63  Today 
the life settlement industry and its permutations are taking the 
place of common law wager policies.64  A life settlement is the sale 
of a life insurance policy for value.65  The life settlement market has 
evolved from viatical settlements, to stranger originated life 
insurance, and most recently, to state enactment of Medicaid 
settlement legislation.66 
A. The Evolution of Insurable Interest in the United States: 
60.  Id.  
61.  Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 782 (1881) (“The same ground which 
invalidates the one [a policy at issuance] should invalidate the other [a subsequent 
assignment]—so far, at least, as to restrict the right of the assignee to the sums actually 
advanced by him.”). 
62.  Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156. 
63.  See Allison Schrager, Investing in Other People’s Life Insurance Makes a 
Comeback, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-07-30/life-settlements-investors-interest-in-life-insurance-grows 
[https://perma.cc/6NCL-XFUV] (“Life settlements were born of the related practice of 
buying the life insurance policies of those who are terminally ill,” i.e., effecting viatical 
settlements.); see also Michael G. Koutnik, Comment, Long Live Life Settlements: The 
Current Status and Proposed Direction of the Life Settlement Market, 96 MARQ. L. 
REV. 913, 926 (2013) (Following viatical settlements, another “market, this time 
fraudulent, grew from the life settlement market: the STOLI policy market.”). 
64.  See Seniors Beware, supra note 3 (“When you sell your life insurance policy, 
whoever buys it is acquiring a financial interest in your death.”). 
65.  What is a Life Settlement?, supra note 18. 
66.  There are other forms of settlement in related industries, such as stranger 
originated annuity policies.  Memorandum from the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’r to All 
Insurers Selling Life Ins. or Annuities in the U.S. (2011), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/legal_bulletin_111018_stoa.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5F8-
NH9T]; Elizabeth D. Festa, NAIC Issues Bulletin Against Stranger-Originated 
Annuities, LIFEHEALTHPRO (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/10/12/ 
naic-issues-bulletin-against-stranger-originated-a [https://perma.cc/TKE8-FTLM].  
Though there are many parallel concerns, these are beyond the scope of this Note.   
186 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:177
Viatical Settlements 
Modern life settlements originated in the 1980’s as viatical 
settlements in response to the AIDS crisis.67  A terminally ill 
person could sell an existing life insurance policy to a third-party 
that lacked an insurable interest in her life.68  The investor paid the 
insured a lump sum in exchange for assignment of owner and 
beneficiary.69  As treatment for AIDS improved, this market 
opened beyond the terminally ill and life settlement companies 
targeted seniors with Stranger Originated Life Insurance 
(“STOLI”).70 
B.  Stranger Originated Life Insurance71 
In a STOLI sale an investor solicits an elderly prospect and 
invites her to purchase a life insurance policy.72  The investor pays 
the premiums, and after the contestability period,73 the owner 
transfers ownership to this investor.74  The investor pays a fee to 
the owner following the assignment,75 and the owner gets free life 
67.  Schrager, supra note 63.   
68.  James Vlahos, Are You Worth More Dead Than Alive?, N.Y. TIMES: 
SUNDAY MAGAZINE (Aug. 10, 2012), at MM30, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/ 
magazine/are-you-worth-more-dead-than-alive.html.   
69.  Id.  
70.  Schrager, supra note 63.   
71. Larry King, the well-known former talk show host, is one of the most 
prominent STOLI victims.  Anita Huslin, Wealthy Engage in Controversial Re-selling 
of Life Insurance Policies, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/26/AR2007112602182 
.html.  At the recommendation of his broker, King purchased $15 million in life 
insurance.  Id.  He then sold the policies for $1.4 million.  Liam Pleven & Rachel Emma 
Silverman, An Insurance Man Builds a Lively Business in Death, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 
2007, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB119604142916903531.  King alleged 
that his broker did not review the tax implications of the transaction or the impact it 
would have on purchasing life insurance in the future, and was unhappy that he did not 
know the identity of those who would benefit from his death.  Huslin, supra.  He settled 
the dispute in 2008 without disclosing the terms.  Mike Myers, Larry King Settles Life 
Insurance Suit, CONTINGENT FEE BUSINESS LITIGATION (Sept. 2, 2008), 
http://www.contingentfeeblog.com/2008/09/articles/life-insurance-1/larry-king-settles-
life-insurance-suit/ [https://perma.cc/4MYN-YDYH]. 
72.  Mary Ann Mancini & Caitlin L. Murphy, The Elusive Insurable Interest 
Requirement: Are You Sure the Insured Is Insured?, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 
409, 439 (2012). 
73.  The contestability period is usually two years.  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 58-15-10 (2014) (After two years the policy is “incontestable, except for 
nonpayment of premiums or fraud on the part of the applicant or insured . . . .”).  
74.  Mancini & Murphy, supra note 72.  
75.  Id.  
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insurance during the contestability period.76  While Grigsby is cited 
to authorize the life settlement market,77 by distinguishing 
Warnock, the Court explicitly denounced the STOLI market 
subset, taken out “for the purpose” of a stranger owning the policy 
where “a person having an interest lends himself to one without 
any, as a cloak to what is, in its inception, a wager . . . .”78 
Life insurance policies have a limited contestability period, but 
in some states, fraud may be alleged outside the period.79  When 
STOLI is litigated as the fraudulent purchase of a life insurance 
policy, an insurer must prove the intent of the purchaser at the 
inception of the contract.80  The life insurance policy is “lawful only 
if . . . purchase[d] . . . with a good-faith intent to obtain insurance 
for the benefit of his family, loved one, or business; they are not 
lawful if . . . purchase[d] . . . with the intent to resell it to a stranger 
at the earliest possible moment.”81  Importantly, because litigation 
occurs after the third-party reports a death claim, it is often the 
deceased party whose intent is at issue.82 
C. State Action in STOLI 
In response to the negative effects of STOLI on consumers, 
many states have enacted legislation based on a hybrid of two 
model laws.  First, the National Conference of Insurance 
Legislators (“NCOIL”) proposed a model in 200783 with a waiting 
period of two years84 between the purchase of a life insurance 
76.  Vlahos, supra note 68; see generally Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 
N.E.2d 535 (N.Y. 2010). 
77.  Whether Grigsby truly authorizes the life settlement market, or merely does 
not prohibit it will be discussed later in this Note.  See infra Part V.C. 
78.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911). 
79.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-10 (2014) (After two years the policy “is 
incontestable, except for nonpayment of premiums or fraud on the part of the applicant 
or insured . . . .”).  But see Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 682 N.E.2d 624, 625 
(Mass. 1997) (holding that “insurer could not rescind policy for fraud after passage of 
two-year statutory contestability period”).   
80.  Life Prod. Clearing, LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).   
81.  Id.  
82.  Until the obligations under the policy become due, the issue is not ripe for 
judicial review.  See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Mosier v. Phoenix Life Ins. 
Co., 8:12-cv-00227-PSG-E (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012) (“[I]n so far as the Receiver’s 
claims are based on the assertion the [sic] Phoenix [the insurer] plans to deny coverage 
under the Policies if and when they become due, absent an unequivocal statement by 
Phoenix to this effect, such allegations are not ripe for review.”). 
83.  NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. 
LEGISLATORS 2007), http://www.insurereinsure.com/files/upload/2005368I.pdf. 
84.  This time period matches the contestability period in most states.  See, e.g., 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-10 (2014).  However, the contestability period refers to 
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policy and when it may be sold to a party lacking insurable 
interest;85 the model explicitly defines and prohibits STOLI.86  
Second, in 2009, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (“NAIC”) proposed its own model act that 
expands the waiting period on life settlements to five years87 but 
lacks recourse for premium financing, one of the techniques to fund 
STOLI.88  Many state laws reflect these models,89 actively working 
to prevent STOLI because it is dangerous to allow investments that 
thwart the purpose of purchasing life insurance.90  New York and 
California are examples of states that did not adopt either model. 
In New York,91 the intent of the original purchaser of a life 
insurance policy does not matter, as decided in Kramer v. Phoenix 
Life Insurance Company.92  The New York Court of Appeals held 
that New York law incorporates the common law understanding 
that a policy “valid at the time of procurement” may be assigned to 
a party not having an insurable interest, as long as the policy was 
“‘valid in its inception.’”93  The decision to purchase the life 
the time period when an insurer may challenge the contract (for a reason besides fraud 
or unpaid premiums).  The waiting period in this NCOIL model prevents an owner 
from selling the policy during that time.  NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT 
(NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. LEGISLATORS 2007), http://www.insurereinsure.com/ 
files/upload/2005368I.pdf.  Although the time periods align, the two laws address two 
unique issues. 
85.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 223A (2014).  Massachusetts has 
adopted the NCOIL model, requiring a two-year waiting period for settlement 
following issuance, with certain exceptions.  Id.   
86.  NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. 
LEGISLATORS 2007), http://www.insurereinsure.com/files/upload/2005368I.pdf.  
87.  NAIC VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(a) (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 2009), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-697.pdf.   
88.  Id.  Premium financing is an arrangement where the premium is paid as a 
loan, and the life insurance policy itself serves as collateral for the loan.  It is an 
indicator of STOLI, but there are legitimate premium finance arrangements.  U.S. SEC. 
AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 11. 
89.  See Mary Jo Hudson, Baily Cavalieri LLC, Life Settlements & STOLI A 
Case Law Update, Presentation at the NAIC CLE 15 (2013), 
http://baileycavalieri.com/165-Life%20Settlements%20and%20STOLI.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5M8-P8E8].  As of 2013 nine states had a five year waiting period, 
one state had a four year waiting period, and twenty one states had a two year waiting 
period before a life insurance policy may be sold.  The other nineteen states did not 
incorporate either model into their insurable interest laws.  Id.   
90.  NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS. 
LEGISLATORS 2007) 1, http://www.insurereinsure.com/files/upload/2005368I.pdf. 
91.  Similar to New York, New Jersey does not prohibit STOLI.  Donna 
Horowitz, 2013 saw end of market’s decline, THE DEAL PIPELINE (June 19, 2014), 
(Special Report) at 1, http://www.thedeal.com/pdf/2013LSSpecialReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KZL7-BGK5].  
92.  940 N.E.2d 535, 536–537 (N.Y. 2010).   
93.  Id. at 541.  
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insurance policy must be “free from nefarious influence or 
coercion,” but, absent this, the intent to immediately sell the policy 
after purchase is irrelevant.94  While reaching a decision so contrary 
to the majority of states, the court recognized that there is “tension 
between the law’s distaste for wager policies” and the court’s 
holding, but reiterates that this “is not [the court’s] role” as it 
simply interprets the law.95  The court found that New York law 
does not prevent STOLI if the purchaser had an insurable interest 
at that moment, regardless of an intent to sell.96 
California’s law is a stark contrast to New York’s.  California 
recognized that its insurable interest law could not combat STOLI 
as it evolved, despite the best attempts of insurers.97  Investors 
create new ways to skirt the law: for example, purchasers would 
create a “shell third-party entity”—like a trust—to mask STOLI 
and allow truthful responses on the life insurance application 
meant to prevent STOLI.98  In response to STOLI’s persistence, 
California law now addresses the issue of the straw man,99 stating 
that “[a]ny device, scheme, or artifice designed to give the 
appearance of an insurable interest where there is no legitimate 
insurable interest violates the insurable interest laws.”100 
 
D. The “Legitimate” Secondary Market for Life Insurance: Life 
Settlements 
Though STOLI is illegal in most states, it is merely a subset of 
a much larger life settlement market.101  While most states have 
94.  Id.  
95.  Id. at 542.  
96. Id.  (“It is not our role, however, to engraft an intent or good faith 
requirement onto a statute that so manifestly permits an insured to immediately and 
freely assign such a policy.”). 
97.  Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Gordon R.A. Fishman Irrevocable Life Trust, 
638 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 (Cal. 2009) (“[T]he [California] law as it presently exists 
allows this kind of insurance arrangement to be valid. . . . [I]t is perhaps best to follow 
the wisdom expressed long ago by President Ulysses S. Grant, who said that ‘the best 
way to get rid of a bad law is to enforce it.’”). 
98.  Am. Gen. Life Ins. v. Goldstein, 741 F. Supp. 2d 604, 608 (D. Del. 2010) (“In 
order to conceal the nature of [STOLI] policies, the insured individual will often 
designate the policyholder and/or beneficiary of the proceeds to be a shell third-party 
entity such as a trust, and then transfer the beneficiary interest [in the trust, rather than 
the life insurance policy] to a STOLI entity after obtaining the policy.”).  This way, 
there is no beneficiary change through the insurer to raise suspicions.  Id. 
99.  CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1 (West 2010). 
100.  Id.  
101.  JOSEPH E. LASKA, THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN STOLI AND OTHER 
SCHEMES 53 (2012), http://online.fliphtml5.com/gxrx/hmch/#p=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
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enacted legislation to prevent STOLI (i.e. life insurance originated 
by, and purchased on behalf of, a stranger, third-party investor), 
this state action is not meant to eliminate life settlement 
transactions as a whole.102  It is legal to sell a life insurance policy 
that was purchased in good faith and with insurable interest.103 
1. The Life Settlement Market by the Numbers 
There are two payouts in a life settlement.  First, the investor 
pays the current owner a settlement price at the time of settlement, 
i.e., assignment.104  Second, the new owner as beneficiary collects 
the death benefit at the insured’s death.105  The policy’s face value 
along with other factors, such as the insured’s age, medical history, 
and life expectancy, determine the settlement price.106 
The life settlement market is a small fraction of the whole life 
insurance industry.  The aggregate face value of life insurance in 
the United States in 2010 was $18 trillion.107  By comparison, in 
2014 the aggregate face value of policies in the life settlement 
market totaled only $32 billion.108  The life insurance industry wrote 
$130 billion in new premiums in 2012.109  In 2013 only $2.57 billion 
(in face value) of life insurance policies were sold in the secondary 
842Q-6TPE] (“Currently 39 states have either banned STOLI or have introduced 
legislation to do so.”). 
102.  CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1 (West 2010) (While an “insurable interest 
shall . . . exist at the time the contract of life . . . insurance becomes effective, [it] need 
not exist at the time the loss occurs.”). 
103.  See Life Settlement Questions, supra note 53.  
104.  Pleven & Silverman, supra note 71.  
105.  Id.  
106. Seniors Beware, supra note 3 (“When you sell your life insurance policy, 
whoever buys it is acquiring a financial interest in your death.”).  It is, thus, a legal 
forum to wager on another person’s life (where the person has already validly procured 
life insurance and is now willing to sell such coverage).  James Vlahos, Are You Worth 
More Dead Than Alive?, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY MAGAZINE (Aug. 10, 2012), at MM30, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/magazine/are-you-worth-more-dead-than-
alive.html.  (“For all the advancements that aim to make life-expectancy science more 
precise, death remains one of the most uncertain certainties around.  When you invest 
in an individual life settlement, you are placing a bet.”). 
107. EY, CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY TO THE US 
ECONOMY 3 (2014), https://www.acli.com/Issues/Taxes/Documents/EY_ACLI-Life-
Insurance-Industry-Contributions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UMU-ZR7U].  
108.  Press Release, Conning, Life Settlements and Secondary Market Annuities: 
Opportunities and Challenges (Oct. 14, 2015) https://www.conning.com/pressrelease-
detail.aspx?id=12916 [https://perma.cc/BN9L-KEMY]. 
109.  FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT ON 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 14 (June 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/ 
reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20Annual%20Report%202013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2F38-79XW]. 
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market.110  Fifteen life settlement companies dominate the industry, 
controlling almost 87% of the market and generating 1,281 
settlements in 2013.111  These policies had a face value of $2.23 
billion and settled for $362 million, an average settlement payout of 
16.2%.112 
Even though the life settlement market is small in proportion 
to the life insurance industry, it is growing.113  The life settlement 
market grew by over 20% from 2012 to 2013,114 and is estimated to 
grow from $35 billion in 2013115 to $150 billion within ten years.116 
2. Lapse Rates in the Life Insurance Industry 
Not all life insurance policies are in force at the time of the 
insurable event—the insured’s death—a significant number lapse.117  
This is a factor for life insurance companies in setting policy 
premiums.118  General life insurance lapse rates are reported at 
85%,119 or even 88%, though not disclosed by insurance 
companies.120  The lapse rate for the population targeted by the life 
settlement industry, those over sixty-five years old, is near 35%.121 
3. State Regulation of Life Settlements 
Some state laws regulate contact between the owner of the life 
110.  Horowitz, supra note 91, at 1.  
111. Id. at 4.  The fifteen top life settlement companies in 2013 include the 
following: Coventry First, Magna Life Settlements Inc., Settlement Group Inc., Life 
Equity LLC, Abacus Settlements LLC, Legacy Benefits LLC, Berkshire Settlements 
Inc., CMG Life Services, FairMarket Life Settlements Corp., Institutional Life Services 
LLC, GWG Life Settlements, Habersham Funding LLC, Maple Life Financial Inc., 
RiverRock Partners LLC, Montage Financial Group Inc.  Id.  
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. 
115. Laura Davison, Pay for Death-Bet Middlemen Fuels Risk, Conning Says, 
BUS. WK. (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:51 PM) http://swissinfo.ch/eng/compensation-for-death-bet-
middlemen-fuels-risk--conning-says/40806762 [https://perma.cc/96NB-LFVC].  
116.  Huslin, supra note 71.   
117.  DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP & THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, THE 
LIFE SETTLEMENTS MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON CONSUMER 
ECONOMIC VALUE 12 (2005), http://www.quatloos.com/uconn_deloitte_life_ 
settlements.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM2L-Z5HE]. 
118.  Id. 
119.  See Huslin, supra note 71.   
120.  DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, supra note 117, at 12.  
121.  Id.  Perhaps as people age, mortality is easier to accept and the value of the 
death benefit significantly outweighs the premiums due.  In addition, the longer a 
person has owned a life insurance policy, the more they have invested in it. 
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insurance and the insured.122  For example, the owner-investor may 
only contact a healthy insured once every three months to verify 
her health status—if she is still living, but may contact an unhealthy 
insured, someone with a life expectancy of less than one year, once 
every thirty days.123  States also regulate the disclosures required 
prior to the life settlement—a free-look provision,124 and privacy 
requirements regarding the medical information are submitted to 
determine the value of the policy.125 
4. Tax: the Transfer for Value Rule 
While many states regulate the practice of a life settlement 
transaction, it is the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) that 
regulates the proceeds.126  The IRS treats the proceeds of a life 
settlement differently than the death benefit of a policy.127  Life 
insurance, the “favored child of the Internal Revenue Code,”128 has 
unique tax privileges.129  Generally, a life insurance death benefit is 
not taxed as gross income under the Internal Revenue Code 
(“Code”).130  One exception to this special treatment is a life 
insurance policy that is transferred for valuable consideration.131  
Under the transfer for value rule, a death benefit paid in a life 
settlement exceeding the consideration and premiums paid for the 
122.  E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175 § 220 
(2015); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7811 (McKinney 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 744.364 (2014); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-36-109 (West 2015). 
123.  OR. REV. STAT. § 744.364 (2015).  The owner-investor may be tempted to 
have more frequent contact in order to file death claims as soon as possible and receive 
the death benefit. 
124. A free-look provision is a period of time, often ten days, in which a 
purchaser of life insurance may renege the contract without penalty.  See, e.g., S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-8.1 (2015). 
[A person may] return the policy . . . within ten days [and] have the premium 
paid refunded if, after examination of the policy, the purchaser is not 
satisfied . . . for any reason . . . . [I]t is void from the beginning and the parties 
are in the same position as if no policy had been issued. 
Id.  
125.  E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 220 (2015). 
126.  I.R.C. § 101 (2013). 
127.  Id. 
128.  Donald O. Jansen & Lawrence Brody, The Often Overlooked Income Tax 
Rules of Life Insurance Policies, TAX’N PLAN. AND COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, Autumn 
2013, at 56, http://www.willamette.com/insights_journal/13/autumn_2013_6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y65S-LYLP]. 
129.  I.R.C. § 101 (2013). 
130.  I.R.C. § 101(a)(1) (2013). 
131.  I.R.C. § 101(a)(2) (2013). 
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assignment is taxable as gross income.132 
There are two related exceptions to the taxation of life 
insurance benefits.  First, accelerated death benefits of a life 
insurance policy are not taxed under the Code.133  An accelerated 
death benefit is an additional, negotiable term of a life insurance 
contract whereby the insured may receive a portion of the death 
benefit early if she is terminally or chronically ill.134  Not all life 
insurance policies carry this feature since it is an optional term of 
the contract. 
Second, the Code also makes an exception for viatical 
settlements.135  A viatical settlement is the same as a life settlement, 
except that the seller must be terminally or chronically ill to qualify 
for the settlement.136  If a terminally or chronically ill person does 
not have an accelerated death benefits rider on her policy, she may 
still sell the policy to a qualified viatical settlement company.137  
Under these circumstances, the IRS treats the amount paid to the 
insured by the viatical settlement company as a death benefit, and 
not taxed.138 
These two exceptions to the transfer for value rule created 
confusion about how to tax a life settlement.  In response, the IRS 
issued two revenue rulings in 2009.139  The first of these revenue 
rulings demonstrated that in a life settlement, the amount realized 
by the seller of the policy is income under the Code.140  The second 
revenue ruling clarified that the profit incurred from a death 
benefit following a transfer for valuable consideration is taxed as 
gross income.141  With these clarifications, the IRS was 
unambiguous that the life settlement market is not entitled to the 
tax benefits of life insurance.142 
132.  Id. 
133.  I.R.C. § 101(g) (2013). 
134.  Id.  
135.  This exception was implemented with the passage of HIPAA in 1996.  Gary 
J. Gasper, New Tax-Free Treatment of Viatical Settlements, THE CPA J., May 1997. 
136. Terminal illness is an illness with a life expectancy under twenty-four 
months.  NAIC Viatical Settlements Model Act, supra note 87, at 697–5.  A chronic 
illness is when the person is unable to perform two activities of daily living (specified in 
the Act), requires substantial supervision, and has a level of disability comparable to 
the definition provided by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Id. at 697–2. 
137.  Gasper, supra note 135.  
138.  I.R.C. § 101(g)(2)(A) (2013).  
139.  Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B.; Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B. 
140.  Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B (Situation 2). 
141.  Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B.  
142.  Jansen & Brody, supra note 128, at 56.  
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5. The Life Settlement Market Abroad 
The life settlement market attracts investors beyond the 
United States.143  The United States is the largest secondary market 
for life insurance, followed by Japan and the United Kingdom;144 
Germany most recently joined the market in 1999.145 
Although life settlements have been legal in the United 
Kingdom since 1844,146 they are disfavored in the retail market by 
financial regulators.147  In 2012 the Financial Services Authority 
(“FSA”)148 called traded life policy investments (“TLPIs”) 
“toxic.”149  The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”)150 calls them 
“death bonds,” and explains that the insured’s are “typically . . . US 
citizens.”151  These “schemes” are “high–risk,” additionally they are 
“offshore and so outside of [its] regulatory scope.”152 
Canadian law restricts trafficking life insurance policies.153  In 
143. The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, BVZL INT’L SECONDARY 
MKTS. FOR LIFE INS., http://www.bvzl.de/index.php?language=en&main_id=15&sub_id 
=57 [https://perma.cc/H9GK-Z2P6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
144.  The UK Secondary Market, BVZL INT’L SECONDARY MKTS. FOR LIFE 
INS., http://www.bvzl.de/index.php?language=en&main_id=15&sub_id=59 
[https://perma.cc/6LZL-K56G] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
145.  The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, supra note 143. 
146.  Id. 
147. Traded life policy investments, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-products/investments/types-of-
investment/traded-life-policy-investments [https://perma.cc/2JNU-7XBM] (modified 
Feb. 14, 2014).   
148.  This regulatory authority has since been split in two, the Financial Conduct 
Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority.  FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk 
[https://perma.cc/BHV3-4PB9] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015). 
149.  Natalie Holt, Consumers Hit Out at FSA Over Life Settlements, MONEY 
MARKETING (Aug. 16, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/consumers-
hit-out-at-fsa-over-life-settlements/1056262.article [https://perma.cc/26AN-VTHL]. 
150. How We Operate, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, http://www.fca.org.uk/ 
about/governance [https://perma.cc/KN4P-MWLN] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (The 
FCA is “accountable to the Treasury and, through them, to Parliament.”). 
151. Id.; Traded life policy investments, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-products/investments/types-of-
investment/traded-life-policy-investments [https://perma.cc/2JNU-7XBM] (last 
modified Feb. 14, 2014).  
152. Traded life policy investments, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/financial-services-products/investments/types-of-
investment/traded-life-policy-investments [https://perma.cc/2JNU-7XBM] (last 
modified Feb. 14, 2014). 
153. Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. I.8, § 115 (Can.) (“Any person . . . who 
trafficks or trades in life insurance policies for the purpose of procuring the sale, 
surrender, transfer, assignment, pledge or hypothecation thereof to himself, herself or 
itself or any other person, is guilty of an offence.”). 
2016] INSURABLE INTEREST AND THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 195
Ontario, however, the Financial Services Tribunal determined that 
this restriction is limited to Canadian life insurance policies.154  And 
thus, Canadian investors actively participate in the US life 
settlement market.155 
The US life settlement market is attractive to foreign investors 
for many reasons.  First, unlike the term156 and endowment157 
products primarily offered to the secondary markets in the United 
Kingdom and Germany, the US life settlement market is largely 
made up of permanent policies158 (whole life and universal life).159  
Second, in countries such as Canada, life settlements are largely 
banned within the provinces, so investors cross the border to 
participate.160  Third, if premiums are paid, there is a guaranteed 
payout because death is a certainty—the only unknown is when.  
Therefore, the life settlement market attracts investors beyond US 
borders, but the lives being gambled on are largely those of US 
citizens. 
154.  Trading in life insurance policies, FIN. POST, http://www.financialpost.com/ 
story.html?id=8a7866a1-f652-434a-a18d-1eb4c301b38e [https://perma.cc/7KT8-YXC5] 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
155. Tara Perkins, Manulife unit battles U.S. ‘life settlements’ industry, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Aug. 23, 2012, 4:56 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-
investor/manulife-unit-battles-us-life-settlements-industry/article573948/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CCR-JUSY]. 
156.  Term life insurance provides coverage for a certain period of time, normally 
between one and thirty years.  Life Insurance Basics, INS. INFO. INST., 
http://www.iii.org/article/life-insurance-basics [https://perma.cc/S7RH-7BH3] (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
157. An endowment policy is an investment tool that also includes term life 
insurance.  If the insured dies during the term, a death benefit is paid.  Amy Fontinelle, 
The Pros Of An Endowment Life Insurance Policy, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/12/endowment_life_insurance.asp (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2016).  
158. Permanent life insurance remains in force until the insured’s death if all 
premiums are paid.  Life Insurance Basics, supra note 156.   
159. The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, supra note 143.  Both whole life 
and universal life insurance is a type of permanent policy, but with universal life 
insurance the premiums are more flexible.  Life Insurance Basics, supra note 156.  As 
cash value accumulates in the policy, the policy owner has the option to reduce the 
premium payments as long as the interest earned on the cash value is sufficient.  Id.   
160.  Perkins, supra note 155.  
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III.  STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET: 
MEDICAID SETTLEMENTS161 
The US life settlement market has not only attracted global 
players, but also the attention of state governments struggling to 
reduce deficits.162  In 2013 Texas became the first state to enact 
Medicaid settlement legislation, in which Medicaid candidates 
could sell their life insurance policy to an investor and use the 
settlement funds to finance long-term care.163  Medicaid normally 
has a five-year look-back period where transfers of assets are 
evaluated for qualification.164  Under Medicaid settlement 
legislation, the policy that is subject to the settlement is not 
considered an asset despite the transaction occurring within five 
years of the application.165  In exchange for waiving the look-back, 
this financing technique delays the implementation of tax-funded 
Medicaid benefits for the candidate, saving the state significant 
money.166  Other states are now following.167 
Medicaid settlement legislation has two forms: the private 
option and the public option.168  States such as Kentucky and Texas 
adopted the private option, while other states such as Florida and 
Louisiana propose making both options available.169  Kansas and 
161. The term “Medicaid Settlements” is the phrase used by the American 
Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) to describe the legislation discussed in this Note.  
Presentation given by The Honorable Robert Damron, et al. on Medicaid Settlements 
to the 2013 ACLI Annual Conference, 2 (Oct. 2013) (on file with author).  Recognizing 
the influence of the ACLI, and the likelihood that this phrase will be commonly used in 
the future, this Note adopts the ACLI term. 
162. E.g., ST. OF ME. FINAL REP. OF THE COMM’N TO STUDY LONG-TERM 
CARE FACILITIES LEGIS. 126 (2013). 
163.  TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015). 
164.  Glossary, LONGTERMCARE.GOV, http://longtermcare.gov/the-basics/ 
glossary/#Look_Back_Period (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
165.  TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015). 
166. ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, at 4 (La. 2013) 
http://www.ldi.la.gov/docs/default-source/documents/publicaffairs/annualreports/scr-
104.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [https://perma.cc/GR44-CD7M]; FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 
ADMIN., ACCELERATED LIFE BENEFITS TECHNICAL ADVISORY WORKGROUP 7 (Jan. 
15, 2013) http://www.lifecarefunding.com/pdfs/florida-medicaid-legislative-
report.pdf?file=2013/1/Florida+Medicaid+Legislative+Report+and+Bill+Policy+Conve
rsions+to+Long+Term+Care+2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/BG6Q-7QP2] [hereinafter 
“Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup”]. 
167.  E.g., IND. CODE § 12-151-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2015); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631 (West 2014). 
168.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 8.  
169.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631 (West 2014); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 
32.02613 (West 2015); Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 
166, at 7; ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166. 
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Indiana passed legislation for the public option.170  A New Jersey 
bill creating the public option is currently pending after a similar 
bill did not pass during the 2012–13 legislative session.171 
A. The Medicaid Program 
Medicaid is a joint state and federal program that “finances 
health care for the poor.”172  However, with the cost of long-term 
care, “[t]hose who have been solidly middle class or more for their 
entire adult lives are forced to rely on Medicaid . . . .”173  The “gray 
tsunami” of baby boomers are reaching the age where they may 
need long-term care, and the Medicaid system cannot handle the 
influx.174  States finance their portion through “permissible taxes” 
and “legislative appropriations.”175 
To qualify for Medicaid, a candidate must have limited assets 
and income.176  Privately held life insurance policies can disqualify a 
candidate for Medicaid coverage.177  As a result, Medicaid 
candidates often forfeit life insurance in order to “spend down” 
their assets.178  Medicaid settlement legislation proposes two 
alternatives to the current forfeiture options.179 
B.  The Private Option 
A Medicaid settlement through the private option is very 
similar to a private life settlement as is currently practiced in the 
secondary market.180  A Medicaid candidate finds a life settlement 
170.  IND. CODE § 12-15-2-17 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2015). 
171. LA. DEP’T OF INS., HCR 210 OF THE 2014 REGULAR SESSION: USE OF 
VIATICAL SETTLEMENT FOR LONG-TERM CARE OF MEDICAID APPLICANTS 3–4 
(2014), http://www.ldi.louisiana.gov/docs/default-source/documents/legaldocs/hcr-210-
14.pdf?sfvrsn=10 [https://perma.cc/P8TJ-GD7V].  
172.  BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 585 (2nd ed. 2000). 
173. Public Hearing on LD 1092 Before the Joint Standing Committee on 
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of 
Richard A. Erb, President and CEO Maine Health Care Association) 
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc.asp?id=9065 
[https://perma.cc/A8NR-FEEK]. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Financing & Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/ 
medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/financing-and-reimbursement/financing-
and-reimbursement.html [https://perma.cc/T6T4-TRU3] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).   
176.  ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 2. 
177.  Id. 
178.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 7; 
Page, supra note 21.  
179.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 9. 
180.  Id. at 8–10.  If the life settlement company is aware of the pending Medicaid 
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company willing to purchase her life insurance policy and transfers 
ownership to the investor.181  The difference between the Medicaid 
settlement through the private option and a normal life settlement 
is that, under the state Medicaid settlement legislation, the 
proceeds from the settlement go to an irrevocable bank account, 
and the funds may only be used for long-term care.182  Following 
this transaction, the settlement funds will not disqualify a candidate 
for Medicaid.183  Current information available on this legislation 
does not state whether the settlement proceeds are taxed as 
income.184 
C. The Public Option 
The public option bypasses the third-party investor.185  Instead, 
the state acts as a fiduciary in the life insurance transaction.186  
Under this option, the Medicaid applicant irrevocably assigns the 
state as the primary beneficiary of her policy.187  In return, the state 
takes over paying the premiums and makes periodic payments to 
the applicant to reimburse the cost of long-term care.188  Current 
state agencies would administer the process.189 
The public option is considered a collateral assignment, and 
when the insured dies the state is reimbursed for the cost of paying 
the Medicaid benefits and premiums.190  Any remaining funds are 
paid to the “named beneficiaries of the policy.”191  The Florida 
legislation does not address that the insured and the policy owner 
need not be the same person, in other words, the owner of the asset 
denial, the bargaining power will significantly swing to their favor.  See supra Part II.D. 
181.  See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1111A.002 (22) (West 2011). 
182.  S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal 
Impact Statement, at 6, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/0794/Analyses/2013s 
0794.cf.PDF [https://perma.cc/ED2X-DFFB]. 
183.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 10.  
Medicaid typically has a “[f]ive-year period prior to a person’s application for Medicaid 
payment of long-term care services [where the] agency determines if any transfers of 
assets have taken place during that period that would disqualify the applicant from 
receiving Medicaid benefits for a period of time called the penalty period.”  Glossary, 
supra note 164.   
184.  E.g., Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166. 
185.  Id. at 9–10. 
186.  Id. at 10.   
187.  Id. at 9.  
188.  Id. at 10.  
189.  Id. at 9.  
190.  S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal 
Impact Statement, supra note 182 at 7.   
191.  Id. 
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might not be the insured.192 
D.  The Cost of Medicaid and the Savings of Medicaid Settlements 
Medicaid is the third largest government program, having a 
budget of $265 billion per year.193  In the next ten years, annual 
federal Medicaid funding is expected to reach $554 billion.194  The 
states pay an additional $160 billion a year for Medicaid.195  It is 
“estimated that 70 percent of Americans who reach the age of 65 
will need some kind of long-term care for at least three years 
during their lifetime.”196  These long-term care costs, if not 
privately funded, are covered by Medicaid even for those over 65 
because Medicare does not cover long-term care.197  Long-term 
care ranges from a private nursing home room with a national 
average annual cost exceeding $90,000 in 2012 to a home health 
aide for $21,000 a year.198 
Florida studied the cost savings of the proposed Medicaid 
settlement legislation through the Center for Economic Forecasting 
and Analysis.199  The Center’s report on the financial impact of the 
proposed Medicaid settlement legislation in Florida concluded that 
“allowing these conversions would benefit elders . . . in Florida who 
become self-care limited by approximately $138–157 million (net) 
annually.”200  Other states rely on this Florida study to estimate 
their own economic savings.201 
192.  Id. 
193.  Michael D. Tanner, ObamaCare created a Medicaid time bomb, N.Y. POST, 
(Dec. 7, 2013, 9:15 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/12/07/the-medicaid-time-bomb/. 
194.  Id. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Betty Ann Bowser, Why Long-Term Care for U.S. Seniors is Headed for 
‘Crisis’, PBS (Mar. 20, 2013, 11:50 AM) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/ 
americas-looming-long-term-care-crisis-and-what-can-be-done/ 
[https://perma.cc/HXN3-NUK6].  See also, How Much Care Will You Need?, 
LONGTERMCARE.GOV, http://longtermcare.gov/the-basics/how-much-care-will-you-
need/ [https://perma.cc/MR2R-GYGN] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“Someone turning 
age 65 today has almost a 70% chance of needing some type of long-term care 
services and supports in their remaining years.”). 
197. What’s not covered by Part A & Part B?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www. 
medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/not-covered/item-and-services-not-covered-by-
part-a-and-b.html [https://perma.cc/L94H-5NCW](last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
198.  ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 2. 
199.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 8. 
200.  Id. 
201. Public Hearings on H.R. 3174 Before the Joint Standing Committee on 
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of 
Senator Margaret Craven) http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getTestimonyDoc 
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IV.  THE RISK OF MEDICAID SETTLEMENTS 
Mandating the insertion of a settlement feature into life 
insurance policies could raise the cost of life insurance policies 
by an undetermined amount and make life insurance less 
affordable, causing an undetermined number of [people] to 
forego the purchase of life insurance and leave their families 
more financially at risk upon their demise.202 
This conclusion by the Louisiana Advisory Work Group is a 
grim warning.  The rapidly growing life settlement market poses a 
significant danger to the life insurance industry,203 and Medicaid 
settlement legislation only exacerbates the problem.204  The appeal 
of the immediate cost savings can be analogized to a pay-day 
loan—immediately richer, but ultimately worse off. 
A.  The Problem with Life Settlements 
Many participants in a life settlement are harmed, from the 
insured, to the policy owner, to the original beneficiary, to the 
insurance company, to anyone who may purchase life insurance in 
the future.  To begin with, the insured is harmed.  The financial 
value of a life limits the insurance available to cover that person.205  
When an insured sells her life insurance policy, the policy is still in 
force and can reduce or eliminate the amount of personal life 
insurance that the insured is eligible to purchase in the future.206 
There are also tax implications to life settlements that may 
impact policy owners, as the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”) warns.207  By selling a policy, the policy 
owner forgoes the favorable tax treatment intended for the 
product.208  “[P]ublic policy should encourage families to protect 
themselves financially from the unexpected loss of a provider,” but 
.asp?id=9064 [https://perma.cc/6QND-C8R8]. 
202.  ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 4. 
203. As an example, a book of policies with  $100,000,000 in face value and a 
50% lapse rate is converted through settlements from a $50,000,000 future payout 
liability to a 0%zero percent lapse rate and $100,000,000 future payout liability because 
death is a certainty, not a risk. 
204. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613(l) (West 2015) (requiring the 
department to proactively advertise and raise awareness about the life settlement 
option); see also ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, 
at 6 (“To supplement private marketing efforts, the legislature could direct education 
initiatives by state government.”). 
205.  Seniors Beware, supra note 3. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Id.; What is a Life Settlement?, supra note 18. 
208.  I.R.C. § 101 (2013). 
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this public policy does not extend to the sale of life insurance and 
neither do the tax benefits.209  Despite the states’ legislative silence 
on the tax treatment of Medicaid settlements, the IRS is explicit 
that life settlements do not receive the benefit of the tax treatment 
of life insurance.210 
Beyond these tax concerns, a life settlement is financially 
imprudent for policy owners.  An economic study performed by 
Deloitte Consulting and the University of Connecticut concluded 
that a “policyholder with impaired health could maximize her 
estate value if other assets are liquidated and the life insurance 
policy is maintained until death.”211  This study was completed 
before Medicaid settlement legislation developed, but the principle 
remains: the amount received by the policy owner in a life 
settlement, 16.2% in 2013,212 is not a good deal, and it is 
unconscionable to intimate that losing 83.8%213 of a guaranteed 
death benefit is prudent.214 
When a permanent policy lapses, the owner is not walking 
away empty-handed.215  The policy owner had a period of life 
insurance where the death benefit would have been paid if the 
insured died, similar to a term policy.  However, this person 
purchased a permanent policy with the option to retain the policy 
beyond a fixed term.216  The fact that it lapsed does not mean the 
209.  Tax Expenditure of the Week: Tax-Free “Inside Buildup” of Life Insurance, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/open-
government/news/2011/03/30/9220/tax-expenditure-of-the-week-tax-free-inside-
buildup-of-life-insurance [https://perma.cc/D6GG-HREE] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
210.  I.R.C. § 101 (2013); Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B.; Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B. 
211.  DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, supra note 117, at 13. 
212.  Horowitz, supra note 91, at 4 (dividing the total paid: 362,169,970, by the 
total face value: 2,231,933,404, to calculate the percentage of the guaranteed death 
benefit that is received). 
213.  This is not even calculating the tax incurred through the settlement. 
214.  Seniors Beware, supra note 3 (“Life settlements can have high transaction 
costs and unintended consequences.  And even if you decide a life settlement is 
generally right for you, it can be hard to tell whether you are getting a fair price.”). 
215. As long as premiums are paid, with a permanent policy the termination of 
the policy is the decision of the policy owner.  See generally Life Insurance Basics, INS. 
INFO. INST. http://www.iii.org/article/life-insurance-basics [https://perma.cc/S7RH-
7BH3] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).  With a term policy, the termination of coverage is a 
term of the contract.  Id.  Therefore, if a ten year term policy terminated after year ten, 
or a policy owner allowed a permanent policy to lapse after year ten, the permanent 
policy still had a feature that was not part of the term policy—the right of continuance.  
If the insured is diagnosed with cancer in year ten, the permanent policy is much more 
valuable in comparison to the term policy.  Id. 
216.  Permanent life insurance remains in force until the insured’s death if all 
premiums are paid.  Id.   
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policy was a waste; the protection was provided and the right to 
continue the policy existed.217  The owner purchased a feature, 
permanence, at her option, which she did not exercise.218 
In addition to the harm and risks to the insured and policy 
owner, the original beneficiary loses.  In a life settlement, whether 
or not part of a Medicaid settlement, the original beneficiary loses 
the expected death benefit.219  It was the policy owner’s original 
desire for the benefit to go to the named beneficiary.  Situations 
and relationships change, but especially in the circumstances 
surrounding a Medicaid life settlement, the desire to leave a legacy 
may not have vanished.  Nonetheless, bureaucratic rules on 
retained assets mandate the assignment to the state.  The desire to 
leave a legacy, to leave the next generation better off than the 
current, actually harms the intended beneficiaries left behind.220 
Insurers also suffer losses in a life settlement.  Insurers rely on 
many factors when pricing a life insurance policy, including 
mortality, persistency, lapse rates,221 expected profits, and the 
impact of technology in improving health.222  Insurers experience 
economic gains when a life insurance policy lapses because they 
have collected premiums on a policy that will not pay a death 
benefit.223  This economic gain is used to subsidize remaining in 
force policies and price new policies.224  Therefore, if policies that 
would otherwise lapse are now sold to investors, the insurer is less 
profitable.225 
There are now professional investors in a private market and 
“[t]he ramifications . . . are enormous to say the least.”226  State 
involvement to keep many more policies in force raises the 
217.  Id.   
218.  Id. 
219.  E.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015). 
220.  While the loss of choice is not a legal harm, there is a notable emotional 
benefit to the policy owner (or insured) to have the death benefit go to the beneficiary 
of her choosing.  See Huslin, supra note 71. 
221.  Some recognition must be given to the argument that healthy lives lapse 
while unhealthy lives persist, or keep their life insurance policy in force.  DELOITTE 
CONSULTING LLP, supra note 117, at 2.  However, this argument fails to recognize that 
a life settlement is more often related to the financial condition of the policy owner 
than the physical health of the insured.  And, even someone with impaired health faces 
a better return on her investment by retaining the policy than selling it.  Id. 
222.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 19. 
223.  Id. 
224.  Id. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Page, supra note 21. 
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financial obligations of insurance companies in unexpected ways.227  
But not all view these ramifications as a problem.  Chris Ortesis, 
Chief Executive Officer of the life settlement company Life Care 
Funding, testified before the Maine Senate Committee on 
Insurance and Financial Services that there are “clear winners with 
Life Insurance Policy Conversions[.]”228  They are “[t]he policy 
owner and their family . . . . [t]he provider of long term care 
services . . . . [t]he state of Maine’s Medicaid program and the 
taxpayers.”229  When it comes to making large profits, where there 
are clear winners there are also clear losers.  While the state and 
the provider of long-term care services win, not mentioned are the 
profits for life settlement companies.230  Unacknowledged losers are 
life insurance companies and the policyholders that will be held 
accountable to cover the higher payments.231 
In the future, the life settlement market may have no winners.  
The 2010 Security and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Task Force 
found that “[w]hile life settlements may impact an insurer’s 
profitability and financial condition[s] . . . the extent of this impact 
is likely to be small.”232  This small impact projection relies on “the 
very small percentage” of life insurance policies that have been 
sold.233  However, laws must be enacted with the future in mind.  
Medicaid settlement legislation has the potential to increase the 
size of the life settlement market significantly.234  Although the life 
227. Warren S. Hersch, Texas Law Promoting Life Settlements is Bad News, 
LIFEHEALTHPRO (June 21, 2013) http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/06/21/texas-law-
promoting-life-settlements-is-bad-news [https://perma.cc/SZ94-JV2J]. 
228.  Public Hearings on L.D. 1092 Before the Joint Standing Committee on 
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of Chris 
Ortesis, CEO of Life Care Funding) http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/get 
TestimonyDoc.asp?id=9066[https://perma.cc/A8NR-FEEK]. 
229.  Id. 
230. Id.  Mr. Ortesis stated that his company, Life Care Funding, “aims to make 
about 10 percent on each purchased policy.”  Darren Fishell, Former Insurance 
Lobbyist Teaches Seniors How to Avoid Medicaid for End-of-Life Care, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://bangordailynews.com/2014/09/12/ 
business/former-insurance-lobbyist-educates-seniors-on-how-to-avoid-medicaid-for-
end-of-life-care/. 
231. Public Hearings on L.D. 1092 Before the Joint Standing Committee on 
Insurance and Financial Services, 2013 Leg., 126th Sess. (Me. 2013) (statement of Chris 
Ortesis, CEO, Life Care Funding) http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/get 
TestimonyDoc.asp?id=9066 [https://perma.cc/A8NR-FEEK]. 
232.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 20. 
233.  Id. 
234. E.g., Texas requires the department to proactively advertise and raise 
awareness about the life settlement option.  TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613(l) 
(West 2015) (“The department shall educate applicants for long-term care services . . . 
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insurance industry may not suffer in the short term, the future of 
the industry is at risk now with the enactment of Medicaid 
settlement legislation.  These expansions will propel the life 
settlement market to a point where it is no longer a “very small 
percentage” of the industry.235 
Insurance contracts from this point forward will be priced with 
Medicaid settlement law in mind.236  The additional expense will be 
passed to future policy owners,237 and the cost of life insurance will 
increase.  This cost will be spread throughout new policy owners, 
because insurers will recover costs and have no way to distinguish 
those who are purchasing the policy as an investment to sell in a 
future market with those who are purchasing the policy to invest in 
their family and protect their family for conventional purposes.  
With only one product to sell, the first will purchase a policy that is 
cheaper than actuarially priced, and the second will be compelled 
to cover the difference. 
B.  The Problem with the Public Option 
The public option recommended in Florida238 and enacted in 
Kansas and Indiana presents additional unique concerns.239  The 
public option is a collateral assignment.240  This means that the state 
pays the policy premiums, is assigned the irrevocable beneficiary, 
and makes periodic payments to the policy owner to reimburse the 
about options for life insurance policies, including options that do not allow a life 
insurance policy to be considered as an asset or resource in determining eligibility for 
medical assistance.”).   
235.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 20. 
236. Id. at 13 (“Insurers base their premium rates on certain assumptions, 
including assumptions of policy lapse rates.”); DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, supra 
note 117, at 12.  (“One of the key actuarial assumptions used in pricing a life insurance 
contract is the anticipation of lapse rates.”). 
237.  Future policy owners will bear the additional expense because the cost of 
life insurance is determined at time of contract; it is locked in.  Why I Purchased Life 
Insurance at 23, NEW YORK LIFE, http://www.newyorklife.com/learn-and-plan/why-
purchased-life-insurance-at-23 [https://perma.cc/LGK3-54WJ] (last visited Feb. 22, 
2016). Some term life insurance has increasing premiums as a product feature (part of 
the original policy terms), but these products are not the target of the life settlement 
market.  Life Insurance - Top Ten Questions, DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/consumer/que_top10/que_life.htm [https://perma.cc/E8AV-
WN4P] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
238. This bill did not pass in Florida. CS/SB 794: Medicaid Eligibility, FLA. 
SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/0794 [https://perma.cc/ 
795H-9CYY] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
239. IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014); 
Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166 at 10. 
240. IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014). 
2016] INSURABLE INTEREST AND THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 205
cost of long-term care incurred by the policy owner.241  At an 
insured’s death, the state retains the portion of the death benefit 
that reimburses the state for the cost of Medicaid and the life 
insurance premiums paid.242  Any death benefit beyond that 
amount is awarded to the original beneficiary.243 
1.  Medicaid Settlements are not a Collateral Assignment 
First, in this public option arrangement, the state has a 
perverse interest in the early death of the assignor.244  If the 
assignor outlives the death benefit of her life insurance policy,245 
then the state becomes responsible for the extended portion of her 
long-term Medicaid care.246  While it is true of Medicaid in general 
that the longer a person lives the higher the expense for the state, 
this relationship removes any notion of an insurable interest—any 
interest in the “continued life” of the assignor247—for the assignee, 
the state.248 
Second, by labeling the settlement a loan,249 the state has 
statutorily created an insurable interest that is contrary to the long-
241.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 9–10. 
242.  IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014).  It is 
not clear whether the state recoups all the long-term costs, or only the costs financed by 
the state (as opposed to the federal contribution). 
243.  IND. CODE § 12-15-1-21.7 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6233 (2014). 
244. While this is true for the Medicaid program in general, it is not a 
characteristic of traditional collateral assignments.  See In re Taslis, 41 B.R. 47, 49 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (“Generally, a collateral assignment of an interest in property is 
a secured transaction whereby a borrower assigns his interest in property to a lender to 
secure performance of an obligation.  The assignee for security (the secured party) has 
the right to collect the assigned claim and apply the proceeds in satisfaction of the 
secured debt; any surplus belongs to the assignor (the borrower).” (citations omitted)). 
245. The death benefit has been pre-spent via assignment to the state.  
Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166 at 10.  “The state 
acts as a fiduciary intermediary converting assets held in a life insurance contract to 
periodic payments offsetting the cost of long-term care confinement.”  Id. 
246.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.631(2) (West 2014) (“Medicaid . . . shall begin 
on the day following exhaustion of the life settlement proceeds . . . .”). 
247.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 460 (1876). 
248. Medicaid, and the elderly in general, carry financial burdens for the state 
outside the Medicaid settlement legislation.  See supra Part III.D.  However, the scope 
of this argument is limited to say that the state has no insurable interest in the life of 
the insured (who may, or may not be the Medicaid recipient).  See generally Conn. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460.  Without this insurable interest, it is inaccurate to 
classify the relationship established in a Medicaid settlement as a collateral assignment.  
Id.  Without insurable interest, the relationship established by a Medicaid settlement 
falls within the boundaries of the proposal of this Note.  See infra Part V. 
249. Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659, 662 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A] collateral 
assignment transfers only those rights necessary to secure the assignor’s debt.”). 
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held definition by the Supreme Court.250  As a loan, the state 
creates an artificial insurable interest by establishing a debtor-
creditor relationship with the Medicaid recipient.251  However, 
Medicaid is a government program that is funded through taxes.252 
Third, in a collateral assignment, the indebtedness to the 
creditor shrinks with each payment.  However, with Medicaid 
settlements, the debt to the assignor increases daily.253  This is the 
opposite of a collateral assignment, and should not be erroneously 
labeled as such, because to do so implies that the state has an 
insurable interest that simply is not present. 
Without insurable interest, there is no collateral assignment 
and the assignment is therefore subject to the distinction set forth 
in this Note’s proposal.  Medicaid settlements should only be 
available to life insurance policy owners who choose to purchase 
the specific endorsement proposed in this Note. 
2. Taxpayers with a Life Insurance Policy are Paying for 
Medicaid Twice 
A taxpayer who also has a life insurance policy that is assigned 
to the state pays twice for the long-term care: once through taxes,254 
and once through insurance premiums.  In this program the 
taxpayer is penalized for purchasing life insurance, even though the 
Supreme Court and the IRS have both recognized and preserved 
the classic form of life insurance.255 
250.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460 (stating that an insurable interest is 
a benefit from the “continued life of another”).   
251.  Id.  (“It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life . . . 
and the creditor in the life of his debtor.”).   
252. Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 175.  States must recoup some of 
the costs of Medicaid through the Medicaid Estate Recovery Program.  42 U.S.C. § 
1396p (2015).  However, the total recovered is miniscule, 0.13% of the total amount 
spent on Medicaid in 2005.  Medicaid Estate Recovery Program, FACTCHECK.ORG, 
http://www.factcheck.org/2014/01/medicaid-estate-recovery-program/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q5G5-3WG5].  “Given the small amounts recovered compared to 
total Medicaid spending, it is reasonable to surmise that Medicaid estate recovery is a 
relatively infrequent occurrence.”  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Medicaid 
Estate Recovery Collections, ASPE, https://aspe.hhs.gov/legacy-page/medicaid-estate-
recovery-collections-143701 [https://perma.cc/T9JE-CRRE] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
253.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 3.  
“Upon the death of the Medicaid recipient, the state would recoup its costs of 
providing Medicaid benefits and . . . paying premium from the death benefit.”  
ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 4. 
254.  Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 175.   
255. I.R.C. § 101 (2013); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 U.S. at 460 (“[I]n life 
insurance the loss can seldom be measured by pecuniary values.  Still, an interest of 
some sort in the insured life must exist.”). 
2016] INSURABLE INTEREST AND THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 207
Thus there results a significant detrimental impact to a policy 
owner for purchasing life insurance early; she is essentially 
voluntarily paying for long-term care at an earlier point in her life.  
This creates an incentive to not purchase life insurance.  For a 
candidate with a life insurance policy, Medicaid is a loan program.  
For everyone else, it is government provided assistance.  This 
discrepancy may be justifiable, but, in the very least, must be 
acknowledged. 
C.  Unanswered Questions 
In large part because these laws are new, and in many states 
not yet passed, many questions linger about the programs. 
1. How is the Life Settlement Payout Taxed? 
A life settlement executed outside the scope of Medicaid 
settlement legislation is taxed as income under the Internal 
Revenue Code.256  Under the private option, it is unclear whether 
the settlement is taxed in the same way.  The settlement is 
performed in the exact manner as a non-Medicaid life settlement.257  
The only difference is that the funds are held irrevocably in a state-
controlled bank account, and not considered an asset for Medicaid 
qualification purposes.258 
If the settlement proceeds are taxed as income, the Medicaid 
applicant must be warned.  A person applying to Medicaid is not in 
the financial position to handle a substantial tax bill.259  If the 
settlement proceeds are not taxed, then by foregoing the tax, the 
federal government is endorsing the legislation.260  In addition, if 
not taxed, then the states are acting contrary to the two Revenue 
Rulings in 2009 which unquestionably removed the favorable tax 
treatment of life settlements intended for the conventional life 
256.  Id. 
257.  See Seniors Beware, supra note 3.   
258.  S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal 
Impact Statement, supra note 182.   
259.  Most states limit countable assets to $2,000.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Services, Financial Requirements - Assets, LONGTERMCARE.GOV, http:// 
longtermcare.gov/medicare-medicaid-more/medicaid/medicaid-eligibility/financial-
requirements-assets (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
260.  This is comparable to municipal bonds that do not pay a federal tax, by not 
collecting the tax the federal government is considered to be providing a form of 
“federal aid.”  The Tax Break-Down: Municipal Bonds, THE COMMITTEE FOR A 
RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET (Sept. 13, 2013), http://crfb.org/blogs/tax-break-
down-municipal-bonds [https://perma.cc/84K4-8SAW]. 
208 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:177
insurance market.261  Either way, the tax implications to the 
legislation must be clarified. 
2. What Rate is Charged to Life Settlement Funds for Long-
Term Care? 
The government pays a lower rate to long-term care providers 
under Medicaid than private payers.262  Under the public option, 
where Medicaid candidates are reimbursed for their long-term care 
expenses,263 are these candidates paying the private rate, or the 
government rate?  If it is the government rate, then this legislation 
further discourages the use of private long-term care insurance, or 
adding a long-term care rider to a life insurance policy because 
neither of these two private remedies allow the lower, government 
rate.  If they pay the private rate, then life insurance companies are 
legislatively forced to fund Medicaid at a rate even higher than the 
government’s funding of its own program. 
3. Does this Legislation Apply to Existing Contracts? 
Texas Medicaid settlement law does not specify whether the 
legislation applies to life insurance policies issued prior to the June 
14, 2013 enactment.264  The law states that the new law applies to 
Medicaid eligibility determinations made after January 1, 2014, and 
any determination before that date is governed by the former 
law.265  In the Louisiana study, the work group found that 
“[i]nsurance companies reserves are based on the exposure created 
by their existing contract language.  Statutorily imposing language 
or conditions that alter existing contracts will affect insurer 
solvency.”266  This conclusion reiterates that this Louisiana proposal 
only impacts “new life insurance policies containing [the Medicaid 
settlement] benefit.”267  The law protects the “settled expectations” 
of a party, and the insurer had no reason to anticipate this 
additional financial burden.268 
261.  Rev. Rul. 2009-13 I.R.B.; Rev. Rul. 2009-14 I.R.B.; see supra, Part II.D.4. 
262.  Kevin D. Dayaratna, Studies Show: Medicaid Patients Have Worse Access 
and Outcomes than the Private Insured, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2740.pdf.  (“Medicaid typically pays 
physicians 56 percent of the amount that private insurers pay.”). 
263.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 10. 
264.  TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 32.02613 (West 2015). 
265.  Id. 
266.  ADVISORY WORK GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 4. 
267.  Id. at 7.  
268. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“Elementary 
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To apply this law to in force life insurance policies violates the 
United States Constitution.  “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”269  These laws will impair 
the solvency of life insurance companies to meet the obligations of 
in force contracts, the ability to pay all death claims as promised.  
The law must respect the Constitution and the “[e]lementary 
considerations of fairness.”270 
4.  What if a Medicaid Applicant is the Policy Owner but not 
the Insured? 
Often, the policy owner and the insured are not the same 
person.  For example, a grandparent may purchase life insurance 
on a grandchild.271  If this grandparent applies for Medicaid and 
collaterally assigns the policy to the state, the asset, the life 
insurance policy, will not—hopefully—reimburse the state for the 
Medicaid loan for a very long time.  This is a major oversight in the 
law.272 
This mistake leads to further questions about whether the 
economic savings of this program are correct.  In the public option, 
the state is ignoring a pivotal step in determining the profitability of 
the transaction: the life expectancy of the insured.273  Is the state 
truly willing to take on all risk, or should it be as selective as the 
rest of the secondary market?  States supporting the public option 
fail to address these underwriting concerns.274 
5. Is Medicaid Settlement Legislation Really the Answer? 
Louisiana revisited the proposed legislation, and the Louisiana 
Department of Insurance (“LDI”) updated the 2013 study.275  
Between April 1, 2012, and March 31, 2013, the Louisiana 
Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”) received 
considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know 
what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should 
not be lightly disrupted.”). 
269.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
270.  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265.   
271. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:901C (2012) (With “individuals related 
closely by blood or by law, a substantial interest [is] engendered by love and 
affection.”). 
272.  S.B. 794, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), Bill Analysis and Fiscal 
Impact Statement, supra note 182. 
273.  See Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166. 
274.  See id. 
275.  See LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171, at 4; see generally ADVISORY WORK 
GROUP REP. OF S. CON. RES. 104, supra note 166, at 1. 
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approximately 12,000 applications for Medicaid, of which 423 were 
denied.276  However, of these 423 only eighty owned life insurance 
policies, and only twenty-two were denied Medicaid coverage 
based on the life insurance.277  Only two of the twenty-two life 
insurance policies valued in excess of $50,000.278 
Two states, Kansas and Indiana, have enacted the public 
option.279  Since 2012, only one person in Kansas has used the 
option, assigning the benefits of a life insurance policy to the 
state.280  This is attributed to the legislation being unknown, and not 
desired.281  Indiana passed the legislation in 2011, but has yet to 
implement the public option.282  Florida determined that Medicaid 
settlement legislation would save Florida “approximately $138–157 
million (net) annually.”283  It is to be seen whether this will cure the 
Medicaid financial crises, or whether the cost-saving projections are 
inflated.  Six states failed to pass similar Medicaid settlement bills 
in 2014. 284 
There are additional concerns with how Medicaid settlement 
legislation complies with federal Medicaid law.  For example, the 
Indiana statute limits the assignment, stating that “[t]he office may 
receive funds under this subsection only to the extent permitted by 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p.”285  Federal Medicaid law limits what may be 
recovered following the death of a Medicaid recipient.286  A state 
must obtain “federal waivers or authorizations for [a] state-based 
variation on Medicaid eligibility requirements” which are set by the 
federal government.287  The compatibility of this state legislation 
and federal Medicaid law is unknown.288 
276.  Id. 
277.  Id. at 2 (“[V]iatical brokers purchase only policies with face value of $50,000 
or more.”).   
278.  Id. at 1. 
279.  Id. at 2.  
280.  LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171. 
281.  Id. at 1. 
282.  Id. at 2.  
283.  Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 8. 
284.  California, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.  
Massachusetts has decided to perform a study on the proposal.  LA. DEP’T OF INS., 
supra note 171, at 3. 
285.  IND. CODE § 12-15-2-17(d)(2015). 
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2013).  Kentucky also “acknowledges that 
implementation may be limited by federal law.”  LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171, at 
2. 
287.  LA. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 171, at 3. 
288. Even with the federal authority to deny the variation (thus, effectively 
prohibit state Medicaid settlements), the proposal of this Note is still needed.  The 
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D.  The Conflict of Interest 
States must always perform a regulatory balancing act.  But 
now as a market participant, states face a dangerous conflict of 
interest.  A state must protect the people of the state, reduce its 
own deficit, and keep insurers solvent so that death claims are paid 
as promised.289  These are competing interests, as demonstrated by 
existing and proposed Medicaid settlement legislation. 
While advocates of Medicaid settlement legislation argue that 
this is a consumer first approach, on more careful examination, it is 
not.  Instead, this is a Medicaid-funding approach that first and 
foremost provides revenue to the state, with state consumer’s 
interests pushed to the background.290  If the primary motivation 
behind this legislation is to protect consumers, states should pass 
legislation that considers a life insurance policy a protected asset 
that does not restrict eligibility for Medicaid, similar to a primary 
home or motor vehicle.291  While there is concern for access to the 
cash build up in some life insurance products, legislation to restrict 
access to these funds (which is common in divorce situations) is 
available.292  States are empowered to amend their current 
Medicaid qualifications to treat life insurance in a more favorable 
way.293 
In addition to ways that state governments could 
simultaneously protect life insurance policies and long-term care, 
the life insurance industry provides its own options.  Some insurers 
proposal set forth infra creates a market-based solution to the issue that one (the 
current) market for life insurance is asked to inefficiently handle two distinguishable 
economic uses of life insurance.  Further, unilateral refusal to allow states to pass 
Medicaid legislation would, in effect, legislatively abolish a new segment of the 
secondary market for life insurance, whereas this Note’s proposal would allow the new 
segment but price it according to policy features.   
289. The United States Insurance Financial Solvency Framework, NAIC (2010) 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_us_solvency_framework.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RE9Q-GCFJ]. 
290.  See Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 
8.  
291.  U.S. Dep’t of Human & Human Services, supra note 259.   
292.  In a divorce, a court may issue a Qualified Domestic Relations Order that 
removes some rights of a life insurance policy owner.  E.g., Lessard v. Lessard, No. 
FA97–0343326S, 1998 WL 525533, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1998) (“Husband 
shall name the Wife beneficiary on $150,000 of life insurance insuring his life until he 
no longer has any financial responsibility to her for the payment of alimony.  The 
Husband shall also name each minor child beneficiary on $50,000 of life insurance 
insuring his life.”).  
293.  States determine financial eligibility for Medicaid.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Services, supra note 259.   
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offer life insurance with a long-term care rider, or accelerated 
death benefit rider.294  These riders come at an additional 
premium295 and with unique features, but generally allow for a part 
of the death benefit to be used for long-term care if needed.296 
V. THE PROPOSAL: A FEDERAL RESPONSE 
As demonstrated by this Note up to this point, the states have 
now entered the life insurance market in a way that is in direct 
contradiction to the purpose of life insurance as held by the 
Supreme Court.297 
 
A.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 Authorizes Federal 
Intervention 
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, a federal statute 
preempts a state statute regarding the “business of insurance” 
when the federal statute is deliberate in the regulation of the 
insurance industry.298  The McCarran-Ferguson Act is restricted to 
an Act of Congress which “shall be construed to invalidate, impair, 
or supersede” any state law that regulates the business of 
insurance.299  The Act sanctioned the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)300 and the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act301 among others.  It must now 
address the secondary market of life insurance. 
294.  Elizabeth O’Brien, Hedging your bets on long-term care, MARKETWATCH 
(Nov. 6, 2013, 6:15 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedging-your-bets-on-
long-term-care-2013-11-06.  See supra Part II.D.4. 
295. The additional cost of the long-term care rider serves as further proof that 
current life insurance policies, or policies without this endorsement, are not priced to 
accommodate Medicaid settlements.  See, e.g., Life Insurance with Additional Care 
Benefit, Northwestern Mutual, https://www.northwesternmutual.com/products-and-
services/life-insurance/state/accelerated-care-benefits-state [https://perma.cc/SS6G- 
WVXS] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
296.  O’Brien, supra note 294.  
297.  Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876) (stating that 
the “real purpose” of the life insurance policy must not be a wager, “but to secure such 
advantages, supposed to depend on the life of another . . . to prevent . . . a mere 
wager”); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 780 (1881) (The law is “opposed” to policy 
owners having an “interest[] in the death rather than the life of the party assured.”). 
298.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2014). 
299.  Id. 
300.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat 1936 (1996). 
301.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
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B.  Proposed Federal Intervention: Turn Insurable Interest into a 
Negotiable Term of a Life Insurance Contract 
The federal government should exercise its power under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act to permit life insurance companies to 
offer and negotiate an insurable interest requirement that applies 
subsequent to contract formation as a contract term, and for the 
entire duration of the contract, and to price such policies 
accordingly.  This federal statute would allow a life insurance 
purchaser the freedom to pay for the features of the policy that she 
values without the obligation to subsidize more.  In essence, the 
current life insurance market should be allowed to offer two 
options: a life insurance product that is only assignable with 
insurable interest, and a life insurance product equivalent to 
today’s products that are freely assignable.  The premiums would 
correlate with the contract terms, with the free assignability option 
being more expensive. 
The scope of this proposal must be federal as it must be 
uniform across states that currently have divergent assignability 
laws.  Most states currently enforce assignment of a life insurance 
policy to the extent that the terms of the contract allow.302  This 
also means that these states would presently enforce a non-
assignability clause in a policy.  However, ten states—California, 
Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, 
North Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin—expressly prohibit an insurer 
from restricting assignment of a life insurance policy.303  With 
profitable Medicaid settlement legislation spreading throughout 
the states, there is little motivation for these states to now give life 
insurance companies more contracting power.304 
In addition to these ten states, three more have conflicts within 
their own statutes.  Kentucky allows the assignment of a life 
insurance policy “as provided by [the] terms of the contract,”305 but 
also prohibits insurers from “restrict[ing], limit[ing], or impair[ing] 
in any way the lawful transfer of ownership, change of beneficiary, 
302.  E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 119A (2014). 
303.  CAL. INS. CODE § 10130 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a–465 (2014); 
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 16-111 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2207 (2014); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.200 (2015); N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 3212 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-33 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-22-412 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. § 632.47 (2014). 
304.  See Accelerated Life Benefits Tech. Advs’y Workgroup, supra note 166, at 
8. 
305.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-250(1) (West 2014). 
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or assignment of a policy.”306  Maine307 and Washington308 have 
similar conflicts. 
These thirteen states pose a problem for insurers wishing to 
issue state specific life insurance policies in permissive states having 
non-assignment clauses.  With the mobility of policy owners, a life 
insurance policy that is issued in a state that enforces a non-
assignability clause may subsequently “relocate” with its owner to a 
restrictive state, resulting in an unenforceable contract clause at the 
time of assignment.309  Therefore, with these conflicts of laws, a 
prudent insurer contracts considering the most restrictive states, in 
this case with free assignability (with resultant higher premiums) 
mandated by these thirteen states. 
Without a contract term restricting policy assignment, courts 
rely on state law to determine the validity of the assignment.  With 
most states requiring insurable interest for the first two or five 
years of a policy, after this time period the lack of restriction is 
interpreted as acceptance of free assignability by the insurer.310  
Therefore, without the proposed federal intervention, these state 
laws on insurable interest impliedly restrict life insurers to provide 
multiple insurance policies through unique contract terms 
regarding their assignability. 
As an example, in Grigsby a contract clause stated any claim 
to the policy was “subject to proof on interest.”311  The Court 
determined that without a rule of law supporting the contract term, 
it was unenforceable and “[did] not diminish the rights” of the 
third-party purchaser.312  As such, absent collective state 
306.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-717(1)(p)(3) (West 2014).  
307. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 24-A, § 2420 (2014).  But see ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. TIT. 24-A, § 6812-A (2009). 
308. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.360 (2014).  But see WASH. REV. CODE § 
48.102.130 (2014).  
309. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (holding that an 
insurance policy purchased by an Illinois resident and citizen in Illinois who later 
moved to Florida and became a resident and citizen of Florida was governed by Florida 
law); see also Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) 
(allowing suit in Louisiana under Louisiana law for an insurance policy that was 
negotiated for and issued in Massachusetts, delivered in Massachusetts and Illinois, 
even though under Louisiana law one of the contract clauses was unenforceable).  
310.  Cf. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96, 102 (1920) (interpreting a 
two-year suicide exclusion in a life insurance policy as an “inverted expression” that 
after that time, it is not a defense).  
311.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 157 (1911). 
312.  Id.  (“[A] ‘claim against the company, arising under any assignment of the 
policy, shall be subject to proof on interest.’ But [with] no rule of law to that effect, and 
the company saw fit to pay, the clause did not diminish the rights of Grigsby, as against 
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cooperation, this proposal requires a federal law. 
C.    Grigsby v. Russell not at Conflict 
Grigsby v. Russell, the 1911 decision that is consistently 
recognized as providing Supreme Court acquiescence to the life 
settlement market,313 is not in conflict with this proposal.  In 
Grigsby, the Supreme Court held that there need not be an 
inherent insurable interest requirement in the transfer of 
ownership after the life insurance policy is purchased.314  Therefore, 
under the terms of Mr. Burchard’s contract,315 without a challenge 
by the insurance company, and with “no rule of law” requiring 
insurable interest, the Court permitted the assignment.316 
Under this construct, Grigsby does not contradict a federal 
mandate that insurable interest at assignment be a negotiable term 
of the life insurance contract.  This proposal creates a law 
consistent with Grigsby, and therefore contracts that include the 
term would be enforceable under Grigsby.  According to Grigsby, 
contracts that exclude the insurable interest at assignment term still 
lack an inherent insurable interest requirement at inception, and 
would still be freely assignable.317 
With this proposal, Grisby remains the authority for the life 
settlement market.318  While the Court found no inherent insurable 
interest requirement in the Grigsby contract,319 this proposal will 
allow for an explicit contract term, fully consistent with Grigsby.  
This federally sanctioned freedom of contract would give 
purchasers of life insurance the ability to purchase exactly the 
features of life insurance which they value, without an unwanted 
mandate to purchase the equivalent of a compulsory assignability 
the administrators of Burchard’s estate.”).  Id. 
313. See Life Settlement Questions, supra note 53; see also History of Life 
Settlements in the U.S., supra note 53.   
314.  Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 155 (1911).   
315.  Id.  Mr. Burchard was the original policy owner and insured, who sold the 
life insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby.  Id. 
316.  Id. at 157. 
317.  Id. 
318.  Id.  The language in this Supreme Court decision suggests that the Court did 
not anticipate the reach of this case.  See id.  The Court saw the facts before it as “a 
very different . . . thing from granting such a general license, to allow [Mr. Burchard] to 
transfer it to one whom he, the party most concerned, is not afraid to trust.”  Id. at 155.  
These facts were very different from the “mischievous kind of gaming” objectionable 
since early English cases.  Id. at 156.  This language by the Court implies a limitation 
that falls short of today’s life settlement market.  See id.   
319.  Id. at 157. 
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endorsement. 
D. Concerns with the Proposal 
The Supreme Court recognized in Grigsby v. Russell that life 
insurance has long been characterized as property, “[s]o far as 
reasonable safety permits.”320  Indeed, viewing a life insurance 
policy as an asset is what causes an issue for Medicaid 
qualification.321  The Grigsby Court found that “[t]o deny the right 
to sell except to persons [with insurable interest would] diminish 
appreciably the value of the contract . . . .”322  This remains true: the 
value of a life insurance policy will vary based on the contract 
terms, specifically the free assignability of the policy.  However, the 
premium will correlate to the value of the policy, removing the risk 
of harm to the owner that the Court feared.323  With the freedom to 
purchase either a fully liquid policy or one that is only transferrable 
to one with an insurable interest, the property rights are part of the 
initial contract, allowing contract negotiation in good faith with 
supporting commensurate pricing. 
Additionally, the states’ responses to STOLI, most requiring 
two or five year waiting periods before the sale of a policy absent 
an insurable interest, show that these property rights are not 
guaranteed.  States are willing to delay assignability of all life 
insurance policies in a protective effort that delays property 
rights.324  Contracting property rights at the outset of the policy 
purchase is not an injustice. 
Further, the global life settlement market shows that there is 
not a universal right to sell a life insurance policy as property.325  
This, along with the life insurance products in the US market, is 
why the policies involved in the “world” market are in fact US 
policies, with foreigners gambling on the lives of Americans.326  As 
320.  Id. 
321.  See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, supra note 259.   
322.  Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156. 
323.  Id.  The risk of harm is the “diminish[ed] value” of the policy.  Id. 
324.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 223A (2014).  Massachusetts requires 
a two-year waiting period.  Therefore, for the first two years following the purchase of 
life insurance in Massachusetts, the property rights of that policy are diminished.  Id.   
325.  Ontario, Canada is one example of a place where it is illegal to sell a life 
insurance policy.  Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 115 (Can.) (“Any person . . . who 
trafficks or trades in life insurance policies for the purpose of procuring the sale, 
surrender, transfer, assignment, pledge or hypothecation thereof to himself, herself or 
itself or any other person, is guilty of an offence.”). 
326.  The Secondary Markets for Life Insurance, supra note 143.   
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the life settlement market develops, there is a potential concern 
that foreigners have a financial interest in the early demise of US 
insureds.327 
Finally, the risk to the life insurance industry and the viability 
of insurers to remain solvent within the existing and proposed life 
settlement practices makes it the duty of the federal government 
and states to protect this very asset, otherwise the reasonable safety 
of these assets will be jeopardized.328  Additionally, this proposal is 
narrow and only regulates the insurable interest requirement, while 
leaving the states free to continue to regulate the life insurance 
industry. 
E.   The True Cost: the Risk of Status Quo 
Life insurance is not only for the wealthy.329  It is meant as a 
feasible option for those who want to protect their loved ones and 
make death a simple mourning process without a simultaneous 
devastating financial collapse.330  It is in society’s best interest to 
encourage private life insurance and to reward those who 
financially protect their family.331  The harm to the life insurance 
industry will not manifest itself immediately; it has too much 
momentum for immediate impact.332  But inevitably the life 
327.  This is admittedly conspiratorial, but nonetheless worth mentioning.   
328.  See, e.g. 31 U.S.C. § 313 (2013) (The Federal Insurance Office “monitor[s] 
all aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the 
regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry 
or the United States financial system.”); Massachusetts Division of Insurance, 
MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/government/oca-agencies/doi-lp/mass-div-of-
insurance.html [https://perma.cc/7ECK-8YA6] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“The DOI 
monitors financial solvency [of] insurance companies.”). 
329. When Should You Buy Life Insurance?, KIPLINGER, (Jan. 2015), 
http://www.kiplinger.com/article/insurance/T034-C000-S001-when-should-you-buy.html 
[https://perma.cc/3HTN-HKRA] (explaining that single income families with children, 
single parents, and those caring for elderly parents are all high-need situations for life 
insurance). 
330.  See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 540 (1941) (“[U]sually insurance 
payable to specific beneficiaries is designed to shift . . . the risk of premature death of 
the one upon whom the beneficiaries are dependent for support.  Indeed, the . . . 
protection of contracts and their proceeds intended to guard against just such a risk.”); 
see also Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876) (stating that the 
“real purpose” of the life insurance policy must not be a wager, “but to secure such 
advantages, supposed to depend on the life of another . . . to prevent . . . a mere 
wager”). 
331.  Helvering, 312 U.S. at 539. 
332.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 20.  The life insurance 
industry is so large that a small life settlement market has a negligible impact, but an 
impact will be felt as it grows.  Id. (“Industry observers have predicted that life 
settlements will have an insignificant impact on the insurance industry . . . given the 
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settlement market will reach the size where it irreparably harms the 
industry.  While the current concerns with how to fix and fund 
Medicaid seem insurmountable, these fears pale in comparison to 
the gradual destruction of the life insurance industry.333  Medicaid is 
funded through taxes;334 insurance companies paid $18.1 billion in 
taxes in 2014.335  The industry has $3.6 trillion of invested assets, 
and over 2.5 million employees.336  The size of the industry does not 
make it too big to fail; the size makes it too big to arbitrarily risk, a 
dangerous status quo. 
CONCLUSION 
A prescient Supreme Court in Warnock viewed the 
assignment of a life insurance policy after its commencement as 
“contrary to the general policy of the law respecting insurance, in 
that it might lead to gambling or speculative contracts upon the 
chances of human life.”337  Almost 135 years later, it seems the 
Court’s concerns were well warranted as the free assignability of 
life insurance policies has single-handedly created an entire, rapidly 
growing settlement industry in which both private and public 
players gamble—on aggregate, billions of dollars—on the life spans 
of total strangers. 
Wager policies are “independently of any statute on the 
subject, condemned, as being against public policy.”338  They have 
been condemned, and any conflicting statute diverges from the 
long-standing principles of this country, and others.339  A life 
settlement transaction is, in every sense of the word, a wager.340  
With free assignability, a life insurance policy can become a wager 
policy after purchase.  While the intent of the original purchaser 
very small percentage of in-force policies that have been settled.”). 
333. The Financial Services Industry in the United States, SELECTUSA, 
http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/financial-services-industry-united-
states [https://perma.cc/4UY3-SQEF] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“In 2014, finance and 
insurance represented 7.92 percent (or $1.26 trillion) of U.S. gross domestic product.”). 
334.  Financing & Reimbursement, supra note 175.   
335. Insurance Industry at a Glance, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/industry-overview (last visited Feb. 22, 2016). 
336.  Id. 
337.  Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 780 (1881). 
338.  Id. at 779.   
339.  Id.; Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) (“That life insurance is 
desirable from an economic and social standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk 
of loss from premature death is unquestionable.”).  
340. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 780 (A wager is when the owner “is interested in the 
death rather than the life of the party assured.”). 
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was genuine, the investor purchasing the existing insurance at a 
later date is purchasing a policy in the same way as an original 
owner; there is nothing substantial to differentiate the original 
purchase from the subsequent purchase as pertaining to the 
definition of a wager—a financial gain at the death of a stranger.  
Therefore, to require a good faith intent at the first purchase, but 
not the second is contrary to the condemnation of wager policies 
dating back to the Life Assurance Act of 1774.341 
The life settlement market should not have life insurance 
premiums, payments, and resulting payouts and profits subsidized 
by policies purchased and retained for genuine insurance purposes.  
In an effort to preserve the financial viability of the personal life 
insurance industry, Congress should allow insurers to offer and 
negotiate an insurable interest requirement subsequent to contract 
formation and at the time of assignment as a contract term, and 
should price such policies accordingly.  Life insurance companies 
undertake the risk of others every day.  Every policy sold is more 
financial exposure to the insurer.  Insurers take on the unknown of 
one and spread it among many.  With the many variables and risks 
for which an insurer must account, the life settlement market is 
beyond a reasonable scope of future contingencies.  The solvency 
of life insurance companies hinges on pricing risk, and with the 
combination of two separate and unique markets—life insurance 
for protection, and life insurance as an investment tool—insurers 
will be forced to raise the premiums on the former in order to 
subsidize the risk of the latter.  The victims bearing the economic 
cost of wagers in the market are not the insurance companies, but 
ultimately policy owners. 
The Robin Hood342 appeal to Medicaid settlement legislation 
is tempting, but to steal from the rich—the insurance companies—
to provide for the poor—Medicaid—is to gamble with the entire 
US life insurance industry.  The Robin Hood fantasy must remain 
in English folklore.  Laws as dangerous as Medicaid settlements, 
and an industry as important as insurance, calls for the hue and cry, 
so let it be heard. 
341.  Life Assurance Act, 14 Geo. 3 c. 48 (U.K.). 
342. Robin Hood, Who Was Robin Hood, NOTTINGHAM CASTLE MUSEUM AND 
ART GALLERY, http://www.nottinghamcastle.org.uk/explore/robin-hood 
[https://perma.cc/E8YW-9J6T] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016) (“Robin Hood . . . is a heroic 
outlaw in English folklore, a highly skilled archer and swordsman.  He has become 
known for ‘robbing from the rich and giving to the poor’, [sic] assisted by a group of 
outlaws known as his ‘Merry Men’ [sic].  The origin of the legend is claimed by some to 
have stemmed from actual outlaws, but some say it is only from ballad and story.”). 
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